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Innocence Amid "LUST": 1
The Innocent Buyer and Leaking Underground
Storage Tanks Containing Petroleum
Kevin R. Duncan*
B. Todd Bailey**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Petroleum products have been stored in underground
storage tanks (U8Ts) 2 since the 1950s. 3 These products are
stored in USTs primarily for safety reasons. 4 However, with
the passage of time, many USTs have developed leaks and
have spilled their contents into the surrounding soil and
underlying groundwater. Contamination of our groundwater
has been called a problem of "national significance"5 which
* Kevin R. Duncan is a Washington attorney and a principle in the Seattle
firm of Duncan, Fritch & Hubbard which specializes in the development of
software for the legal profession. Mr. Duncan has an M.A. in Tax and a J.D. from
Brigham Young University in 1991, and is a member of the Washington bar.
** B. Todd Bailey will receive his B.S. and MAce. from the J. Willard & Alice
S. Marriott School of Management, and is a candidate for graduation from the J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University in 1993.
1.
The acronym "LUST" was originally used by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as the designation for "leaking underground storage tanks." However,
"[c]ognizant in this era of new morality that '[h]ell has three gates, lust, anger,
and greed,' EPA . . . changed its LUST program to 'UST.'" MICHAEL L. ITALIANO
E'1' AL., LIABILITY FOR STORAGE TANKS 1 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting BHAGAVAD G!TA
(THE SONG OF GoD) 16 (P. La!. trans.)). The abbreviation "UST" will be used
throughout this paper; however, the acronym "LUST" is used in the title in order
to sound more alluring to prospective readers.
2.
For purposes of this article, an "underground storage tank" is a tank
system, including its piping, that has at least 10 percent of its volume beneath the
surface of the ground. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1988).
3.
Katherine S. Yagerman, Underground Storage Tanks: The Federal Program
Matures, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,136, 10,136 (Mar. 1991).
ld. "The safety reasons relate to fire and explosion hazards. Obviously,
4.
environmental contamination from leakage was overlooked as a safety concern." ld.;
see also U.S. EPA Pub. EPA/530/UST-88-0088, MUSTS FOR USTs 1 (Sept. 1988)
[hereinafter MUSTS FOR USTs] ("Leaking USTs can cause fires or explosions that
threaten human safety.").
5.
HAzARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE AMENDMENTS OF 1984, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
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"has the potential to deplete one of our most precious natural
resources." 6 This is of particular concern because fifty percent
of Americans rely on groundwater for their drinking water. 7
Moreover, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates that a leak of one gallon of gasoline can contaminate
the water supply of 50,000 people. 8
The EPA estimates that there are as many as 2 million
USTs at 750,000 facilities nationwide. 9 Approximately eighty
percent of those tanks are made of bare steel. 10 The EPA
estimates that as many as twenty-five percent of these tanks
are leaking 11 due largely to corrosion of the bare steel. 12 The
Conference Report on the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 indicated that 75,000 to 100,000 USTs
were leaking and projected that as many as 350,000 USTs
could develop leaks within the next five years. 13

1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5699
[hereinafter HSWA CONF. REP.].
6.
Rep. Don Ritter, Foreword to ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at xxiii.
MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 4, at 1; HSWA CONF. REP. supra note 5 at
7.
128.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 3, 4 (citing EPA, Underground Motor Fuel
8.
Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)).
9.
HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 128.
Underground Storage Tank Program, 1991: Hearings on Subtitle I of the
10.
Solid Waste Disposal Act Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991)
[hereinafter 1991 Hearings on UST Program] (statement of Rep. AI Swift,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials); see also 52 Fed. Reg.
12,662, 12,664 (1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280).
11.
MUSTS FOR USTs, supra note 4, at 2. An EPA survey estimated that 18 to
35 percent of USTs are leaking. ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 (citing EPA,
Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)). Thirty-five
percent of non-farm USTs storing petroleum proved to be "non-tight"-i.e., they
were not completely sealed and were possibly leaking their contents. 52 Fed. Reg.
12,662, 12,665 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280) (discussing EPA,
Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey (1986)).
12.
Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,137.
13.
HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 128. The following estimates are
illustrative of the magnitude of the problem presented by leaking USTs:
As of January 1991, the EPA is aware of 95,000 confirmed UST leaks
nationwide. EPA expects several hundred thousand more leaks to be
detected over the next few years as the UST leak detection requirements
are phased in. For comparison purposes, there are approximately 1200
Superfund sites slated for cleanup, less than 5000 RCRA [Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act] hazardous waste management facilities
requiring cleanup, and 30,000-plus listings in the EPA's database of known
toxic waste dumpsites.
1991 Hearings on UST Program, supra note 10, at 291 (testimony of Lois N.
Epstein, P.E., Environmental Defense Fund).
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Facilities which commonly use USTs for petroleum storage
include not only gasoline stations, but also taxi companies,
rental car agencies, fire departments, post offices, marinas,
airports, and construction companies. 14 Many of these
facilities have aging USTs made of bare steel. 15 The EPA
estimates that the failure rate for such tanks due to corrosion
depends largely on the age of the tank. 16 Failures for the bare
steel tanks begin when they are ten to twenty years old, and is
significantly greater for tanks over twenty years old. 17 An
EPA study found that approximately one third of the existing
USTs used to store petroleum are over twenty years old or are
of unknown age. 18
The total number of USTs and the number of leaking USTs
is particularly alarming when the cost of cleaning up a single
spill is considered. Cleanup costs for a single site range from
$20,000 to $1 million. 19 The average cost rose from $85,000 in
1989 to $135,000 in 1990. 20 Many owners of USTs may not be
able to afford the cost of cleaning up a petroleum spill from
their USTs. The median motor fuel outlet in 1987 had $90,000
in net worth, $210,000 in assets, and $14,000 in annual aftertax profits 21-hardly a deep pocket. Furthermore, many of
these fuel outlets cannot afford pollution liability insurance
since the premiums for such insurance have ballooned in the
past several years. 22
Due to the sheer number of USTs in the United States, a
purchaser of property might discover-after closing a deal and
14.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
15.
See supra text accompanying note 10.
16.
53 Fed. Reg. 37,082, 37,088 (1988).
17.
!d.
18.
52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 280)
(discussing EPA, Underground Motor Fuel Storage Tanks: A National Survey
(1986)). A study of USTs in Ohio revealed that approximately 15 percent of tanks
fail after 15 years, and 70 percent of service station tanks failed after 20 years.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 252-53 (citing POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, RISK EVALUATION GUIDE FOR BULK LIQUID STORAGE TANKS (1984)).
19.
1991 Hearings on UST Program supra note 10, at 4 (statement of Rep. AI
Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials).
20.
!d. at 4.
21.
52 Fed. Reg. at 12,671.
22.
Ethel S. Hornbeck, 1991 Joint Survey of C.asoline Marketer Underground
Storage Tank Activity, 2, reprinted in 1991 Hearings on UST Program, supra note
10, at 205, 206. "Private insurance has become increasingly expensive, placing it
out of reach for the average marketer . . . . [O]nly 17 percent of marketers report
carrying PLI [pollution liability insurance], down dramatically from the 40 percent
that had a policy one year ago [1989]." !d.
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acquiring title-that in addition to the property she bargained
for, she has received one or more undisclosed USTs as a bonus.
Because state23 and federal statutes24 impose strict liability
on landowners for the abatement of environmental
contamination on their land, an innocent purchaser can be
liable for cleanup costs despite the lack of any culpability or
involvement with the leak or any knowledge of its presence on
the land. 25 For this reason, and the fact that removing and
cleaning up after leaking USTs is so expensive, USTs have
been called the "scourge of the nation's commercial real estate
business."26
This article will focus on the innocent purchaser who has
acquired property without knowledge of one or more leaking
petroleum USTs on the acquired property, or without
knowledge (or reason to know) of petroleum contamination on
that property from a leaking UST. 27 Part II will examine the
portions of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976(RCRA)28 which govern petroleum USTs, including
financial responsibility for spills and citizen suits to enforce the
operative provisions of that statute. Part III will explore the
impact of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA?9 on petroleum
USTs. Part IV examines common law causes of action which
the innocent purchaser may have against the party(s) at fault
including, but not limited to, the party which sold the property
to the innocent purchaser. Part V concludes that although
relief for the innocent purchaser is limited or nonexistent
under federal statutes, various forms of relief are available at

23.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.89 (Anderson 1989); OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 1301: 7-1-28, 7-7-35, 7-7-36 (1989).
See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
24.
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (1988).
25.
See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(d)(2); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (innocent purchaser held liable for cleanup costs);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983) (purchaser liable on the
basis of property acquisition, without any conduct which contributed to
contamination).
26.
Underground Tanks Are Budget Busters, Bus. REC., Nov. 9, 1992, at 1.
This general definition is adapted from federal statutory exemption
27.
provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988). A higher standard is placed on
purchasers in commercial transactions than in residential transactions who assert
such a claim. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 187 (1986).
28.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA or Superfund].
29.
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common law.
II. RCRA AND USTs
A. RCRA Subtitle I
Federal regulation of USTs is based primarily on RCRA. 30
Subtitle I of RCRA31 specifically governs USTs. Congress enacted Subtitle I to address the problem of groundwater contamination by leaking USTs. 32 Subtitle I sets forth the federal
standards governing USTs. Eight categories of standards are
enumerated: (1) notification of tank existence, 33 (2) leak detection,34 (3) records maintenance,35 (4) release reporting, 36
(5) corrective action, 37 (6) tank closure,38 (7) financial
responsibility39 , and (8) performance standards for new
tanks. 40 Enforcement of these standards may take place at
both the federal and state levels.

1. Shared responsibility of the EPA and state programs
Although Subtitle I is part of a federal statute, states may
assume primary responsibility for its enforcementY States

30.
RCRA §§1002-11002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. RCRA is actually the "Solid
Waste Disposal Act" but is commonly referred to by its RCRA designation. For a
general discussion of RCRA, see Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA, 21
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,254 (May 1991). For a general discussion of the E.P.A. regulations accompanying Subtitle I of RCRA, see Glenn Waddell, Note, A Practitioner's
Guide to the Recently Promulgated UST Regulations, 41 ALA. L. REV. 487 (1990).
31.
RCRA §§ 9001-9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i. Subtitle I of RCRA was codified as Chapter IX of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA). 42 U.S.C. §§69916991i. In keeping with common usage, the designation "Subtitle I" of RCRA will be
used throughout this article to indicate Chapter IX of the SWDA.
32.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i; HSWA CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 5699. Prior to
1984, RCRA did not apply to USTs containing petroleum because they did not
contain "hazardous wastes". See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
33.
RCRA § 9002, 42 U.S.C. § 6991a.
34.
RCRA § 9003(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(1).
35.
RCRA § 9003(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(2).
36.
RCRA § 9003(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(3).
37.
RCRA § 9003(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(4).
38.
RCRA § 9003(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(5).
39.
RCRA § 9003(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d).
40.
RCRA § 9003(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(e).
41.
RCRA § 9004, 42 U.S.C. § 6991c. This shared federal-state responsibility for
enforcement of federal statutes and regulations has been called part of the "new
federalism," a system in which the federal government delegates authority to the
states to implement programs fashioned at the national level and through which
the states receive federal funds for implementing the programs as long as they
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may submit a UST "release detection, prevention, and correction program for review and approval" by the EPA. 42 A state
program is approved only if its regulations are "no less stringent than the corresponding requirements" found in Subtitle I
and in EPA regulations. 43
If a state program receives EPA approval, it will be applied
"in lieu of the Federal program and the State shall have primary enforcement responsibility with respect to requirements of
its program."44 However, if the state program is not yet approved, Subtitle I continues to apply in addition to any independent state or local regulations. 45 Thus far, ten states have
received final approval of their state UST programs: Georgia,46 Louisiana, 47 Maine, 48 Maryland, 49 Mississippi, 50
New Hampshire, 51 New Mexico, 52 North Dakota, 53
Oklahoma, 54 and Vermont.55 Tentative approval has been
received by N evada56 and Rhode Island. 57 The discussion of
Subtitle I which follows is relevant only insofar as it has not
been supplanted by state programs. 58

2. Reach of Subtitle I
Not all USTs are governed by Subtitle I. The scope of Sub-

maintain the federal standards. Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,136.
42.
RCRA § 9004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 281 (1988) ("Approval of State Underground Storage Tank Programs"). Partial state programs are
permitted: "The program may cover tanks used to store regulated substances referred to in 6991(2)(A) [certain hazardous substances] or (B) [petroleum] or both of
this title." !d. (emphasis added).
RCRA § 9004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(b) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. § 281.3043.
281.38 (1988).
RCRA § 9004(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(d)(2) (emphasis added).
44.
45.
Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,138.
46.
56 Fed. Reg. 21,603 (1991).
47.
57 Fed. Reg. 34,519 (1992).
48.
!d. at 24,759.
!d. at 29,034.
49.
50.
55 Fed. Reg. 23,549 (1990).
51.
56 Fed. Reg. 28,089 (1991).
52.
55 Fed. Reg. 38,064 (1990).
53.
56 Fed. Reg. 51,333 (1991).
54.
57 Fed. Reg. 41,874 (1992).
!d. at 186.
55.
56.
!d. at 61,376.
!d. at 53,870.
57.
An examination of the UST programs of individual states is beyond the
58.
scope of this article. For a list of state statutes affecting USTs, see ITALIANO ET
AL., supra note 1, app. 2, at 404-35.
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title I has two important delimitations: a definition of the
tanks which are regulated, and the designation of substances
within those tanks which are regulated. Once Subtitle I is
found to apply to a particular UST, the persons who may be
held responsible for the UST and any spills must be determined.

a. Tanks regulated by Subtitle I. Subtitle I governs only
USTs which meet its definition of USTs. For purposes of Subtitle I, a UST is a tank (including the underground pipes connected thereto) of which at least ten percent is beneath the
surface of the ground59 and which is used to contain a "regulated substance" as defined in Subtitle 1. 60 Some USTs are exempted from Subtitle I. Exempt USTs include farm or residential tanks with a capacity of 1100 gallons or less which are
used for noncommercial purposes, 61 and tanks used for storing
heating oil for use on the premises where the oil is stored. 62
Subtitle l's definition of UST encompasses about 1.4 million
tanks nationwide. 63
b. Substances regulated by Subtitle I. Some USTs meeting Subtitle l's UST definition still fall outside of the scope of
Subtitle I due to the type of substances stored in those tanks.
Subtitle I only governs "regulated substances" which are defined as "(A) any substance defined in section 9601(14)
[CERCLA section 101] 64 of this title (but not including any
substance regulated as a hazardous waste under subchapter III
of this chapter), and (B) petroleum."65 Note that petroleum is
specifically regulated by Subtitle I. In addition, substances

59.
For a definition of "beneath the surface of the ground," see 40 C.F.R. §
280.12 (1988).
60.
RCRA § 9001, 42 U.S.C. § 6991; see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12.
61.
RCRA § 9001(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(A); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12.
62.
RCRA § 9001(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(B). Other types of tanks are also
excluded from Subtitle I's definition of UST. These include septic tanks; certain
regulated pipeline facilities; surface impoundment, pit, pond, or lagoon; storm or
waste water collection systems; flow-through process tanks; liquid trap or gathering
lines used in oil and gas production and gathering operations; and storage tanks
located in underground area but above or upon the surface of the floor where it is
located. RCRA § 9001(C)-(l), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(C)-(I).
63.
52 Fed. Reg. 12,662, 12,664 (1987).
64.
For a discussion of CERCLA classification of substances as hazardous substances, see infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
65.
RCRA § 9001(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2).
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which are otherwise regulated by RCRA subchapter
III-"Hazardous Waste Management"66-are excluded from
Subtitle I thereby avoiding overlap of these two RCRA chapters.
c. Persons regulated by Subtitle I. Subtitle I regulations
focus on owners and operators of USTs. 67 An operator is "any
person in control of, or having responsibility for, the daily operation of the underground storage tank."68 "Daily operations"
should exclude unintentional, inadvertent, or passive operation.69
The term "owner" is much less straightforward. Subtitle I
has two definitions of owner which depend upon when a UST is
"in use":
(3) The term "owner" means(A) in the case of any underground storage tank in
use on November 8, 1984, or brought into use after
that date, any person who owns an underground
storage tank used for the storage, use, or dispensing
of regulated sustances [sic], and
(B) in the case of any underground storage tank in
use before November 8, 1984, but no longer in use
on November 8, 1984, any person who owned such
tank immediately before the discontinuation of its
use. 70

These definitions of an owner are problematic. For example, 71
suppose a tank in use after November 8, 1984, is found to be
leaking. Further suppose that the tank has been leaking for
several years during which time the ownership of the tank has
changed several times. The definition of an owner of a tank in

66.
RCRA §§ 3001-3020, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b. Subchapter III regulates
hazardous solid wastes. RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921. This portion of RCRA has
been called "onerous," Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA, 21 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,254, 10,257 (May 1991), and was dubbed a "mind-numbing journey." American
Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., writing
the majority opinion).
67.
RCRA § 9003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(a).
68.
RCRA § 9003(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6991(4); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1988)
(definition of operator).
69.
Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,140.
70.
RCRA § 9001, 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. §
280.12.
71.
Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,140.
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use after November 8, 1984, is phrased in the present tense,
suggesting that only the current owner of the tank meets the
Subtitle I definition of owner. This interpretation is partially
remedied by language in Subtitle I which states that Subtitle I
liability of an owner or operator of a UST may not be transferred by conveyance to another person. 72
The determination of who is the operator or owner of a
UST is important due to the substantial liability which accrues
to them for violations of Subtitle I's provisions. An owner who
knowingly fails to notify the appropriate state or local agency
concerning the existence of a UST, or who submits false information with respect thereto, is subject to a civil penalty of up
to $10,000 for each tank. 73 Failure of an owner or operator to
comply with EPA regulations and standards under approved
state programs is subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per
tank for each day of violation. 74 Owners and operators may
also be liable for the costs of ''corrective actions"75 incurred by
the EPA or states. 76

3. Response to leaking UST
The responsibility to respond to a leaking UST is shared by
the EPA (or the analogous state agency in states with EPA
approved UST programs) and the owner or operator of the
UST. The initial "corrective action" upon discovering that a
UST is leaking must be undertaken by the owner or operator.
The EPA, however, may also commence "corrective actions"
which are paid for with funds from a trust established for that
purpose in certain circumstances.

RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6)(C)(i).
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall
be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any underground
storage tank or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat
of release under this subsection, to any other person the liability imposed
under this subsection. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement
to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section.
RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6)(C)(i).
73.
RCRA § 9006, 42 U.S.C. § 699le(d)(l).
74.
RCRA § 9006(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(d)(2).
75.
See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
76.
RCRA § 9003, 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(6).
72.
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a. Corrective action. Upon confirming that a petroleum
UST is leaking, 77 the owner or operator must initiate a response to the leak within twenty-four hours. 78 The response
must include reporting the release to the EPA, prevention of
further leakage, and identifying and mitigating fire, explosion
and vapor hazards. 79 Next, the owner or operator must undertake a series of abatement measures including removal of any
petroleum remaining in the tank80 and cleanup of any free
product in order to prevent further potential damage to groundwater.81
The EPA may also undertake "corrective actions" to limit
damage caused by a leaking petroleum UST. 82 In addition to
undertaking the actions required of owners and operators,
allowable EPA corrective actions may include temporary or
permanent relocatiorf of affected residents and the procurement
of alternative water supplies. 83 However, the EPA may undertake these corrective actions only if such action is necessary "to
protect human health and the environment" and one or more of
the following circumstances exists: (1) no responsible and able
party can be found to clean up the leak, (2) the situation requires prompt attention in order "to protect human health and
the environment," (3) the owner or operator of the tank refuses
to comply with an EPA order to undertake the corrective actions, or (4) "[c]orrective action costs at a facility exceed the
amount of coverage required by" Subtitle I and, therefore, "expenditures from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust
Fund are necessary to assure an effective corrective action."84

77.
The steps for investigating and confirming the existence of a leak are enumerated in 40 C.F.R. § 280.52 (1988) ("Release investigation and confirmation
steps.").
78.
40 C.F.R. § 280.61.
ld.
79.
80.
ld. § 280.62.
81.
ld. § 280.64.
82.
RCRA § 9003(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(2). The EPA is also authorized to
issue an order requiring compliance with the provisions of Subtitle I. RCRA §
9006(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(l). In addition, the EPA may commence a civil
action in federal court seeking an injunction or other appropriate remedy. RCRA §
9006(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 699le(a)(l).
83.
RCRA § 9003(h)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(5).
84.
RCRA § 9003(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h)(2) (emphasis added).
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b. UST financial responsibility and the UST Trust
Fund. Subtitle I requires that UST owners or operators demonstrate their "financial responsibility" by proving that they
have a predetermined "amount of coverage."85 The amount of
coverage is an indication of a UST owner or operator's ability to
pay for cleanup of potential leaks of petroleum. Owners or
operators of USTs used for retail sales must have $1,000,000 of
coverage; all other owners and operators must have $500,000 of
coverage. 86 The Trust Fund, which is financed through a gasoline tax, 87 ensures that sufficient funds will be available for
cleanup of spills. 88 However, these funds are not to be used in
lieu of the resources to be provided through the ."amount of
coverage" required of owners and operators. Instead, these
funds are for cleanup costs which exceed the required coverage.s9
The demonstrated financial responsibility of owners or
operators plus the Trust Fund resources may appear to be
available to the innocent purchaser of real estate containing a
leaking UST. However, Subtitle I does not explicitly provide a
means for the innocent purchaser to reach the resources of
former owners. 90 Moreover, the resources of the Trust Fund
are available only to assist owners and operators who have
demonstrated their financial responsibility. 91 These resources
cannot be reached by the innocent purchaser.

85.
RCRA § 900:~(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h); see also 40 C.F.R. § 280.90-280.101
(1988).
86.
40 C.F.R. § 280.93(a).
87.
Yagerman, supra note 3, at 10,143 n.122.
88.
53 Fed. Reg. 43,322, 43,364 (1988).
89.
ld. The EPA indicated that the "Trust Fund . . . was created to provide
cleanup of UST releases in particular circumstances. Congress did not authorize its
use as a financial assurance mechanism. Rather the fund is intended to 'stand
behind' the owner or operator who has obtained financial responsibility in the
required amounts." ld.
90.
The EPA is authorized to seek recovery of costs it incurs in the cleanup of
a spill from a petroleum UST. "Whenever costs have been incurred by the [EPA]
for undertaking corrective action or enforcement action with respect to the release
of petroleum from an underground storage tank, the owner or operator or such
tank shall be liable to the [EPA] for such costs." RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6991b(h)(6)(A).
91.
RCRA § 9003(h)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6)(A).
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B. RCRA Citizen's Suits
Section 7002 of RCRA permits "citizen's suits" to enforce
RCRA's regulatory scheme. 92 Of the three types of citizen's
suits, only one is of value to the innocent purchaser of real
estate seeking reparation of damages from a leaking petroleum
UST. 93 That type of citizen's suit is based on RCRA section
7002(a)(l)(B) which provides that a person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf
against any person ... including any ... past or present owner or operator of a ... storage ... facility, who has [1] contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
[2] solid or hazardous waste [3] which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.94

1

Section 7002(a)(l)(B) lists three elements of a citizen's suit
which determine whether such a suit may be maintained: (1)
contribution, (2) a solid or hazardous waste, and (3) an immi-

92.
RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
93.
Two other types of citizen's suits are available. First, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A)
permits an aggrieved party to initiate a citizen suit "against any person ... who
is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order" pursuant to the provisions of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The person against whom the suit is filed must
currently be in violation of the enumerated provisions. RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. §
6972; see also Harris Bank Hinsdale v. Suburban Lawn, Inc., No. 92 C 6814, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19737, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 1992) (past leak of gasoline from
a UST did not provide sufficient basis for RCRA citizen suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(1)(1)(A)). The suit cannot be based on "wholly past" violations of the
statute. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57, 64 (1987)
(phrase "alleged to be in violation" in the Clean Water Act required showing of
present, ongoing violation to support citizen's suit). Acts or omissions which occurred prior to the innocent owner's acquisition of the property containing a leaking UST cannot form the basis for a citizen's suit pursuant to RCRA §
7002(a)(1)(A). Harris Bank Hinsdale, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5. Therefore, this
type of citizen suit is ineffectual for the innocent purchaser.
Second, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides that "any person may commence a civil
action on his own behalf . . . against the [EPA] where there is alleged a failure of
the [EPA] to perform any act or duty under [RCRA] which is not discretionary
with the [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). This suit is also of limited value to the
innocent purchaser. This type of citizen's suit will permit the innocent purchaser to
compel the EPA to act in its regulatory role. However, it will not enable the innocent purchaser to extract from prior owners or operators the resources or reimbursement for cleanup of the leaked petroleum.
94.
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

I
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nent and substantial endangerment. A federal district court
considered, in two installments of Zands v. Nelson, 95 whether
the three elements were present in a case dealing with a gasoline leak from a UST. The court's decisions will be considered
below.

1.

Zands 1: leaked gasoline as a RCRA "solid waste"

In 1980, plaintiffs Samuel and Sara Zands purchased a
gasoline service station. Prior to the plaintiffs' acquisition of
the station, its gasoline tanks leaked large amounts of gasoline
into the surrounding soil and into the groundwater. The plaintiffs claimed that they were unaware of the leakage. 96
The plaintiffs filed suit against various prior owners and
operators of the station. The plaintiffs' complaint stated various
causes of action including a claim based on the citizen's suit
provision of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B). 97 Both the plaintiffs
and the defendants moved for summary judgement concerning
the plaintiffs' citizen's suit. 98 The issue of whether a citizen's
suit under RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B) could be based on a
petroleum leak from a UST was one of first impression for any
federal court.
The court began by analyzing RCRA's definition of "solid
waste." 99 RCRA solid waste includes "discarded material"
whether in a solid, liquid or gaseous form. 100 The court noted
that the RCRA regulations define "discarded material" as material which has been abandoned, 101 and that materials are solid wastes if they have been "abandoned" by being "disposed"
of. 102 The court also noted that the RCRA definition of "disposal" includes "leaking." 103The court recognized that this

95.
779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal. 1991) [ZaruL~ [], 797 F. Supp. H05 (S.D. Cal.
1992) [Zands II].
96.
Zands I, 779 F. Supp. at 1257.
97.
ld.
98.
[d.
99.
ld. at 1261·64. The court acknowledged that this definition of solid waste is
broad, but not so broad as to include materials which are still useful. However,
the court notes, gasoline which has leaked into the soil is no longer useful despite
that fact that it once had great utility. ld. at 1262.
100.
ld. at 1261 (citing RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1983 & Supp.
1991)).
101.
ld. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2) (1988)).
102.
ld. at 1261-62 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)).
103.
ld. at 1262 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) [RCRA § 1004(3)] (1983 & Supp.
1991)).
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chain of definitions was circuitous. Nevertheless, the court
overlooked this flaw and concluded that Congress intended that
RCRA's solid waste provisions apply to gasoline leaks from
USTs. 104

2. Zands II: ((imminent and substantial endangerment" and
contribution
a. ((Imminent and substantial endangerment." In addition
to reiterating its conclusion from Zands I concerning leaked
gasoline as a solid waste, the Zands II court proceeded to discuss whether the "imminent and substantial endangerment"
and contribution requirements of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B)
were satisfied. The term "imminent and substantial endangerment" is not defined by RCRA. Therefore, the court looked to
other judicial authority for a definition and adopted the following definition: "An 'imminent hazard' may be declared at any
point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in harm
to the public. It is not necessary that the final anticipated injury actually have occurred prior to a determination that an
'imminent hazard' exists." 105 The court concluded that a gasoline leak could ultimately result in harm to the public. 106
Therefore, the "imminent hazard" requirement was met.
b.

Contribution.

The court noted that "[i]ndividuals are

104.
ld. at 1263-64. The court also stated that the plain meaning of the statute
was sufficient to conclude that RCRA hazardous waste provisions applied to gasoline leakage from a UST.
(I]t is evident from the plain language of the statute that a plaintiff can
also prevail in a section 6972(a)(l)(B) [RCRA § 7002(a)(l)(B)] claim by
showing handling, storage, treatment or transportation of solid waste. Moreover, by referring to RCRA as a "cradle-to-grave regulatory regime," Congress expressed its intent that RCRA apply to: (1) those who create solid
waste, (2) those who transport or handle it during its life, and (3) those
who provide a final resting place for it.
The Court holds that there is not an exception for petroleum in section
6972(a)(1)(B) [RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) ].
ld. at 1263-64 (footnotes omitted).
105.
Zands II, 797 F. Supp. at 809 (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
106.
ld. The amount of gasoline actually leaked from the UST in question was
in dispute. Plaintiffs' expert claimed that 30,000 to 40,000 gallons had leaked.
Defendants' expert countered that merely 3,000 to 10,000 gallons of gasoline had
been leaked. ld. at 808.
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liable under RCRA without regard to fault or negligence." 107
However, the court points out that the "contributed to" language of RCRA section 7002(a)(l)(B) requires a causal relationship between a defendant and the "imminent and substantial
endangerment." 108 Plaintiffs may carry their burden of proof
concerning this causal relationship simply by proving that a
defendant owned or operated a gas station:
[O]wners and operators contribute to the contamination if the
contamination is the direct result of activities related to the
operation of a gas station; plaintiff need not prove the specific
cause of the contamination. Clearly, individuals who own or
operate gas stations are responsible for gasoline that leaks
from the piping system or the gas tanks themselves. Indeed,
the direct relationship between the leakage and the equipment owned and operated for use at the gas station is sufficient to prove the element of "contribution." 109

Furthermore, the court concluded that ( 1) if a plaintiff
identifies a period of time during which the petroleum leak
occurred, (2) for which the defendants are strictly liable, (3)
and if all defendants are joined in the action, (4) but the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants "caused" the leakage,
then the burden shifts to the various defendants to prove that
they are not liable for the damage resulting from the leak. no

I
1

I

!r
f'

I

I

I
fi

I

3. Procedural hurdles
Three additional prerequisites must be met by a plaintiff
pursuing a section 7002(a)(l)(B) citizen's suit. First, the
plaintiff must have legal standing to bring the suit. The first
line of section 7002(a) states that "any person may commence a
civil action" under that section. 111 However, the legislative
history indicates that the term "any person" "does not affect
recognized requirements regarding legal standing to bring a
case." 112 Second, ninety days prior to commencing the suit,
the plaintiff must give "notice of the endangerment" to the

107.
ld. at 809.
108.
ld.
109.
ld. at 810 (emphasis added).
110.
Id. at 817 ·18.
111.
RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
112.
H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 52 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
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EPA, the state in which the tank is located, and the person
alleged to be in violation of RCRA. 113 The ninety day period
need not be non-adversarial; a suit by the plaintiff may be
pending against the alleged violator when the ninety-day notice
is given. 114
Third, no action against the alleged violator may be commenced if the EPA, "in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the
activities which may present the alleged endangerment is actively attempting to remedy the "alleged endangerment." 115
These attempted remedies may include prosecuting the alleged
violator, engaging in removal of the solid waste, or obtaining a
court order to have the violator commence a removal action.116 A similar prohibition applies for analogous action
taken by the state. 117

4. Available remedies
An innocent purchaser of real estate containing an undisclosed leaking UST may be able to bring a citizen's suit against
prior owners or operators of the UST. However, the suit will
not necessarily yield the remedy sought. Depending upon the
circumstances, a district court has jurisdiction to do the following: (1) to enforce the provisions of RCRA which are allegedly
violated; (2) to restrain the defendant from causing further
harm; or (3) to order the defendant "to take such other action
as may be necessary." 118 None of these remedies appears to
allow a court to award damages to the injured innocent purchaser. In fact, no court has awarded damages under the
citizen's suit provisions to an innocent purchaser of real estate
containing a leaking UST. 119 The only relief available is enforcement of the RCRA regulations. The innocent purchaser
must look elsewhere for more complete compensation for dam-

113.
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A).
114.
Zands I, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1259-61 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (plaintiffs permitted
to amend their complaint to add a citizen's suit pursuant to RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B)
while the action against the plaintiff was pending).
115.
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B).
116.
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B).
117.
RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C).
118.
RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
119.
RCRA does provide for civil penalties, but these penalties are paid to the
government. See RCRA § 700l(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a); RCRA § 3008(a), (g), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g).
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ages sustained due to the leaking UST.
III.
A.

CERCLA

CERCLA generally
1

CERCLA ~

0

is a congressional response to the environmental harm caused by improper disposal of hazardous waste.
Congress enacted CERCLA to respond to public perception of
the massive problem of inactive hazardous waste sites and
spills of toxic chemicals. 121 CERCLA established a system for
governmental response to spills of hazardous materials and
long-term problems associated with abandoned hazardous
waste. 122 In addition, CERCLA provides for a "citizen suit"
whereby private citizens can sue polluters to enforce the provisions of CERCLA and recover for harms they have
suffered. 123 For instance, the 1986 amendments authorize
private contribution actions-with a three-year statute of limitations-which allow courts to allocate response costs among
liable parties. 124 In addition, the citizen suit provision permits any individual to enforce the Act if the government has
not commenced an action for cleanup. 125
CERCLA liability hinges on whether a substance is classified as a "hazardous substance." 126 Hazardous substances under CERCLA include substances and pollutants listed in the

120.
CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA
or Superfund].
121.
ld. at 265. See al~;o H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1980),
at lK
122.
ld.
123.
CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0, (g) (1988). The private right of action
was added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA]. Prior to SARA,
courts interpreted the statute to mean that innocent purchasers could not bring an
action for recovery of response costs against prior owners unless the property was
on the National Priorities List. Cadillac Fairview/Cal. Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co., 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The unquestioned policy behind CERCLA and SARA was to "encourage private party cleanups and settlements." S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1986).
124.
SARA § 113(b), (g), and (0. The role of the CERCLA contribution action has
limited applicability to a purchaser of land whom we have assumed to be totally
free of wrongdoing. Because it is assumed that no action has yet been brought
against the purchaser, the present discussion will not pursue this as a potential
cause of action.
125.
CERCLA § ~HO, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
126.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).

262

B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law

[Volume 7

Clean Water Act/ 27 hazardous wastes listed in the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (RCRA), 128 hazardous pollutants listed in
the Clean Air Act, 129 toxic substances listed in the Toxic Substances Control Act, 130 and other designated substances. Even
though a substance is deemed a ''hazardous substance" under
CERCLA, it may not actually come within the purview of the
statute. This may occur, for example, due to the CERCLA "petroleum exclusion."
B.

The CERCLA Petroleum Exclusion

Congress provided broad coverage for CERCLA through its
definition of hazardous substances. 131 Nevertheless, Congress
provided for an exclusion from CERCLA coverage: "The term
[hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance ...."132 In creating this exclusion, Congress failed to
define the terms "petroleum" and "fraction." This has permitted
some confusion concerning the applicability of CERCLA to
spills of gasoline and other petroleum products from USTs. The
confusion has arisen because some of the common components
of petroleum-including benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl-benzene and lead-are themselves listed as CERCLA hazardous
substances.

1.

The leading case: Wilshire

In Wilshire Westwood Ass'n. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 133
the Ninth Circuit considered the scope of the petroleum exclusion. In 1987, Wilshire filed a complaint against Atlantic Richfield alleging a claim for response costs pursuant to section
107(a) of CERCLA. 134 Wilshire alleged that gasoline contain-

127.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
128.
RCRA § 1002-11,012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991k (1988).
129.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
lfi U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988).
130.
131.
See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
132.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (emphasis added).
133.
881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
134.
!d. at 802. Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes strict liability on the polluter. That section provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
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ing "hazardous substances" including benzene, toluene, xylene,
ethyl-benzene and lead leaked from a USTs contaminating the
surrounding soil including soil on land owned by Wilshire. 135
Wilshire attempted to circumvent the CERCLA petroleum
exclusion by listing the hazardous substances that are "fractions"136 of gasoline, arguing that these hazardous fractions
should trigger liability for cleanup under CERCLA regardless
of their presence in an exempted petroleum product. 137 The
Ninth Circuit, affirming the decision of the lower court, concluded that CERCLA does not apply to gasoline even though
some of its component parts or common additives are separately designated as hazardous substances by this statute. 138 In
reaching its conclusion, the court considered the plain meaning
of the language of the exclusion, the EPA's interpretations of
the exclusion, and the legislative history of the statute.
The court began its discussion of the plain meaning of the
petroleum exclusion by reviewing standards of statutory construction.139 In particular, the court pointed out that the interpretation of a statute should be in keeping with the general
intent of its framers 140 and that its provisions "'should not be
construed to make surplusage of any provisions."' 141 With no
further analysis, the court held that application of the standards of statutory construction to the CERCLA petroleum exclusion "requires us to exclude gasoline, even leaded gasoline,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of
(4) ... shall be liable for(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(B).
135.
Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 802. The court took judicial notice of the facts that
benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl-benzene, and lead are CERCLA hazardous substances and that they are all components of crude oil. ld. at 803.
136.
The court took judicial notice of the term "fraction": a fraction is "one of
several portions (as of a distillate or precipitate) separable by fractionation and
consisting either of mixtures or pure chemical compounds." Wilshire, 881 F.2d at
803 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (1981)).
137.
ld.
138.
ld. at 810.
139.
ld. at 804.
140.
ld. (citing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
141.
ld. (quoting Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 577 F.2d
668, 67:3 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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from the term 'hazardous substance' for purposes of CERCLA.
Any other construction ignores the plain meaning of the statute
and renders the petroleum exclusion a nullity." 142
Next, the court noted the lack of legislative history. Congress provided virtually no legislative history to accompany its
enactment of CERCLA. 143 Therefore, the court looked to subsequent legislative "history" for clues conceming Congress'
intent conceming the petroleum exclusion. 144 To that end, the
court examined congressional action when Congress had the
opportunity to amend CERCLA and its petroleum exclusion.
The court quoted statements from various members of Congress indicating that those members believed that petroleum
spills were exempt from CERCLA. 145 The court recognized
that these statements provide some inferential, although "hazardous," indication of the vitality of the petroleum exclusion.146
Finally, the Wilshire court considered the EPA's interpretations of the petroleum exclusion. The court indicated that it
reviewed memoranda from the EPA's General Counsel, as well
as EPA pronouncements in the Federal Register, interpreting
the petroleum exclusion. 147 The court did not discuss the contents 148 of the various memoranda and entries in the federal

142.
ld.
14:-l.
ld. at 805.
ld. at 806-08.
144.
145.
ld. at 807. The quotations included such statements as the following.
"[S]pills of the fuel cannot be cleaned up under the Superfund [CERCLA] law because it is a petroleum product." ld. (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. S2028, S2080 (daily
ed. Feb. 29, 1984) (Senator Durenberger introducing the 1984 amendments to
RCRA)). RCRA should be "amended to address the problem of leaking underground
storage tanks, including petroleum tanks which are not covered by Superfund." ld.
(quoting Rep. Strangeland in House debate on the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, 132 Cong. Rec. H9572 (Oct. 8, 1986)). And "[t]his bill
will not diminish the scope of the present petroleum exclusion." ld. at 808 (quoting
1a2 Cong. Rec. S14,932 (daily ed., Oct. 3, 1986) (Sen. Simpson during SARA debate)).
146.
ld. at 808.
ld. at 808 n.8.
147.
148.
Among the memoranda cited by the court is one dated July 31, 1987. ld. In
this memorandum, the EPA General Counsel opines that "fractions of crude oil,
including hazardous substances such as benzene . . . must be included in the term
'petroleum' for that provision to have any meaning. EPA Gen. Coun. Memo. on
"Scope of the CERCLA Petroleum Exclusion Under Sections 101(14) and 104(a)(2),"
at fi (July :n, 1987). This memo also explained the EPA's position relative to lead
additives for gasoline:
"[P]etroleum" under CERCLA also includes hazardous substances which are
normally mixed with or added to crude oil or crude oil fractions during the
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register, but it concluded that "the EPA's interpretation of the
scope of the petroleum exclusion is entirely consistent with its
plain meaning and legislative history ...."149 Moreover, the
court "conclude[d] that the EPA's interpretation of the scope of
the petroleum exclusion should be accorded considerable deference, especially because of the virtual absence of contemporaneous legislative history." 150
The Wilshire court concluded that the CERCLA petroleum
exclusion applies to both refined and unrefined gasoline despite
the fact that certain of its indigenous components and additives
introduced during the refining process are designated as hazardous substances under CERCLA. 151 Accordingly, Wilshire's
CERCLA claim against Atlantic Richfield was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 152

2. Post-Wilshire developments.
The Wilshire court suggested that petroleum products
which contain substances other than their indigenous components and common additives would not be excluded from the
reach of CERCLA. 153 Subsequent courts have reached the
same conclusion under a variety of circumstances. For instance,
"waste oil" resulting from cleaning oil tanks did not fall within
the petroleum exclusion because it contained chromium and
nickel oxides scraped from the interior of the tanks during the
cleaning process. 154 Likewise, the petroleum exclusion did not
refining process . . . . These substances are also part of "petroleum" since
their addition is part of the normal oil separation and processing operations
at a refinery in order to produce the product commonly understood to be
"petroleum."
ld. For additional discussion concerning the interpretive pronouncements by the
EPA, see Michael M. Gibson & David P. Young, Oil and Gas Exemptions Under
RCRA and CERCLA: Are They Still "Safe Harbors" Eleven Years Later, 32 S. TEX.
L. REV. 361 (1991); Richard J. Denny et al., Contamination From Oil and Gas
Production: Who Pays for Cleanup? 1990 MIN. L. INST. ch. 6 (proceedings of 36th
Annual Institute) (July 19-21, 1990).
149.
Wilshire, 811 F.2d at 808.
150.
ld. at 810. Furthermore, Congress granted the EPA considerable discretion
in administering CERCLA. !d. at 809. This is evidenced by language in CERCLA
requiring the EPA to promulgate regulations designating and governing hazardous
substances. !d. (citing CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a)).
151.
!d. at 810; see also Bunger v. Hartman, 797 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (S.D. Fla.
1992); Niesko v. Emro Marketing Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 981-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
152.
Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803 n.3. "The district court simultaneously dismissed
plaintiffs' pendent claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby resulting
in dismissal of the action." !d.
153.
ld. at 805.
154.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D.N.Y.
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apply to waste oil in which the concentration of hazardous substances increased during use. 155
However, the petroleum exclusion is not overcome by the
introduction of all substances to the petroleum. The introduction of soil which does not contain CERCLA-listed hazardous
substances will not of itself overcome the petroleum
exclusion. 156 Instead, the exclusion is overcome by the introduction, or increased concentration of substances which are
otherwise designated as hazardous substances. 157
Whether an aggrieved party has a cause of action under
CERCLA for a leaking UST will depend upon the substance
leaked. If the UST contained hazardous substances other than
petroleum with its indigenous components and common additives, the injured party will not be barred from pursuing relief
under CERCLA for any harm suffered. If, however, a UST
contained only petroleum with its indigenous components and
common additives, the injured party does not have a CERCLA
cause action against the polluter.
IV.

COMMON LAW LIABILITY

Since the innocent purchaser will likely not be made whole
through actions or proceedings based on federal statutes, the
purchaser should consider various common law remedies. Many
common law theories may be employed by the innocent purchaser to recoup costs incurred to cleanup the damage caused
by a leaking petroleum UST. Of course, the applicable theories
will depend upon the facts of the given case and upon the case
law of the jurisdiction. The various theories include actions
arising from the sale of the real estate (e.g., breach of contract
or fraud), negligence, nuisance, and strict liability.
A. Actions Arising from the Sales Transaction

1. A hurdle: caveat emptor
A legal hurdle jn UST cases involving causes of action
1991).
New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see
155.
also Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531-32 (W.D. Wash. 1988);
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 198R U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14219, *3 (E.D. Pa.
19RR).
156.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California (Caltrans), 790 F. Supp. 9R3, 986-87
(C.D. Cal. 1991).
157.
!d.
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arising out of a sales transaction has been the doctrine of
caveat emptor. The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes
this view of vendor liability: "Under the ancient doctrine of
caveat emptor, the original rule was that, in absence of express
agreement, the vendor of land was not liable to vendee, or a
fortiori to any other person, for the condition of land existing at
the time of transfer ...."158 Some courts have created exceptions to the doctrine of caveat emptor and have been reluctant
to take a harsh stand in environmental cases. 159
However, a recent Third Circuit decision leaves the availability of common law actions by purchasers against sellers in
a questionable status. In Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECO) v.
Hercules Inc., 160 the court held that the seller was not liable
to the purchaser, PECO, for an alleged nuisance involving environmental contamination on the land sold. The court concluded
that a vendor is liable only for express provisions in the contract of sale. 161 The court stated that
[i]n the absence of fraud or misrepresentation a vendor is
responsible for the quality of the property being sold by him
only to the extent for which he expressly agrees to be responsible .... The theory of the doctrine is that the buyer and
seller deal at arm's length, each with an equal means of
know ledge concerning the subject of sale, and that therefore
the buyer should be afforded only those protections for which
he specifically contracts. 162

Mter considering PECO's sophistication in purchases of
this kind, the court found that PECO's offer price reflected the
possibility of environmental risks. 163 PECO stands as a
strong impediment to recovery actions by subsequent purchasers on common law theories. 164 The court was reluctant to
158.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 comment a (1977).
159.
See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985) ("the tendency of the
more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat
emptor").
160.
762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
161.
ld. at 312.
162.
ld. (quoting Elderkin v. Geister, 288 A.2d 771, 774-75 (Pa. 1972).
163.
ld. at 314.
164.
Care should be exercised when reading cases which discuss the defense of
caveat emptor. This defense may be an impediment on common law cases, but is
not a bar to recovery in other types of environmental cases. See, e.g., Smith Land
& Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (caveat emptor
inapplicable to actions under CERCLA); Sunnen Prod. Co. v. Chemtech Indus. Inc.,
658 F. Supp. 276 (CERCLA case in which court stated the defense of caveat emp-
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hold sellers liable to potentially remote buyers, especially when
the price reflected a good faith attempt to allocate risks. 165

2.

Contract actions

A contracts might also provide a basis for a common law
cause of action if a breach of that contract occurred. Unfortunately, real estate contracts rarely specify a warranty clearly
enough to impose liability on the seller. 166 Assuming that the
seller passes good title, an innocent purchaser might claim a
breach of covenant against encumbrances. However, one court
has ruled that a claim based on a breach of covenant against
encumbrances does not extend to hazardous waste. 167 The
term "encumbrance" is usually associated with liens, mortgages, easements, restrictive covenants and other third party interests in the land. 168 Because the innocent buyer's liability
for cleanup does not create an outstanding right at the time of
conveyance, an action based on breach of this covenant is not
likely to succeed. 169
If a clear promise was made in a contract and then broken,
that promise might be a better foundation for a claim for
breach. For example, a seller might contract to remediate some
harmful waste if such waste were to appear. In that unlikely
event, failure to perform such a promise would increase the
chances of the seller's liability. But a simple "as is" clause in a
purchase agreement can preclude an action for breach. 170
Another theory based in contractual terms is an action
based on unjust enrichment. "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." 171 The restitution would be equal to the
excess of the cleanup cost over the value of the land trans-

tor could not be employed to shift liability for environmental contamination from
the responsible party to an unwitting purchaser).
165.
PECO, 762 F.2d at 314.
Samuel A. Bleicher & Benjamin G. Stonelake, Jr., Caveat Emptor: The
166.
Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,017, 10,023 (1984).
See United States v. Allied Chern. Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
167.
20,519, 20,520 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
!d.
168.
169.
See Allied Corp. v. FROLA, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1954 (D.N.J. 1989)
(court refused to recognize a breach of contract action to recover cleanup costs,
though other common law claims were possible).
170.
See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984).
171.
RE&'TATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
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ferred. At least one court has rejected this theory. 172 That
court held that the purchaser could not recover cleanup costs
from the prior owner on an unjust enrichment claim because
the seller received the benefit involuntarily. 173
Finally, a purchaser might consider bringing an action to
rescind the transaction completely because of a mutual mistake
of fact. One court commented that "if there were no representations of any kind made by the defendants, rescission should be
granted." 174 The court reasoned that mutual mistake would
exist if neither party were aware of any environmental problems which would give rise to liability. 175 If petroleum USTs
are the source of liability, the seller will usually know of such a
possibility, suggesting that other causes of action would be
better suited. If the seller did not know of the existence of the
USTs, then rescission would be one of the only claims cognizable under common law.

3. Fraud or misrepresentation
As the PECO court pointed out, a purchaser may maintain
an action for fraud or misrepresentation against the offending
vendor in two situations. 176 First, the fraud can be a positive
assertion of a false material fact. Second, the seller can purposely conceal knowledge about environmental problems associated with the property. In both scenarios, even courts reluctant
to impose liability will probably do so. 177
For example, New Jersey's Supreme Court recognized an
exception to caveat emptor for fraudulent nondisclosure in

State Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron
Corp. 178 The court stated that to prove fraudulent concealment by a seller in a real estate transaction, the buyer must
prove "deliberate concealment or nondisclosure by the seller of
a material fact or defect not readily observable to the purchas-

172.
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Okla.
1989).
173.
!d.
174.
Simon v. Oldmans Township, 497 A.2d 204, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1985).
175.
!d.
176.
PECO v. Hercules Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985).
177.
!d.
178.
468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
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er, with the buyer relying upon the seller to his detriment." 179
In Ventron, the court regarded mercury pollution in soil as
a latent defect. 180 The buyer knew the purchase involved a
chemical company, but it did not know of any contamination.
The seller knew of the contamination but intentionally failed to
disclose its existence at the time of the purchase. 181 The court
held that the buyer could recover any decrease in the land's
market value, the cost of a containment system put in by the
buyer, and legal fees incurred by the buyer. 182 In addition,
the court did not hold the buyer liable to the government for
response costs. 183
Misrepresentations by the seller, even those without fraud,
can often provide a basis for liability. 184 The usual remedy allows the buyer to retain the property and receive the difference
between what the property is worth and what it would have
been worth without the misrepresentation. However, one court
has ruled that a seller's superior, even if not actual, knowledge
makes his nondisclosure tantamount to an affirmative
statement. 185 Because some courts have accepted the notion
of a stricter duty to disclose environmental defects, 186 a
seller's failure to disclose pertinent facts can result in an action
for damages by the purchaser who relied upon such a misrepresentation. The misrepresentation might be sufficiently material
to rescind the transaction due to mutual mistake. It might also
nullify an "as is" clause in the purchase agreement or it may
even allow the purchaser to receive punitive damages from the
seller.

B.

Negligence

Most UST litigation founded on common law principles is
based on negligence, or on negligence in combination with other theories including contract, trespass, and nuisance. 187 Neg-

179.
ld. at 166.
180.
!d.
181.
!d.
182.
!d.
183.
!d.
184.
RES'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525C (1977).
Callahan v. Callahan, 514 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
185.
186.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (seller who knows of
facts materially affecting property value must disclose such facts to potential buyers); see also Ventron, 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 118.
187.
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ligence, independent of the other theories, will be discussed
separately. The elements of ordinary negligence include (1) a
duty to exercise reasonable care, (2) a breach of the duty, (3)
causation in fact, plus proximate cause, and (4) actual harm to
the plaintiff. 188

1. Duty of reasonable care
In order to prevail, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant had a duty associated
with a leaking UST. Proof of a leak is irrelevant without a
showing of such a duty. Some pre-RCRA cases held that a UST
owner or operator who had no notice of a leak-and who was
not required by a contract or trade practice to monitor the
UST-could not be held liable for negligence associated with a
leak from the tank. 189
Congress changed this with the enactment of RCRA and
promulgation of regulations thereunder. RCRA has imposed
rules concerning UST design, construction, installation, 190
monitoring 191 and leak detection. 192 These rules establish a
minimum standard of care for tank owners and operators. A
violation of these rules can constitute negligence per se. 193 If
plead by a plaintiff, this would shift the burden of proof away
from the plaintiff and on to the defendant who has violated
RCRA's regulations.

2. Breach of duty of care
Failure to plead a breach of the defendant's duty of care
can defeat a cause of action based on negligence. 194 The
breach of the duty occurs when an owner or operator of a UST
acts, or fails to act, causing damage when an unreasonable risk

188.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 30 at 164-65 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
189.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., Inc., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
190.
40 C.F.R. § 280.20-280.22 (1988).
191.
ld. § 280.30-280.33.
192.
ld. § 280.40-280.45.
193.
Stafford v. United Farm Workers, 656 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1983); Martin v.
Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (1920) (noncompliance with regulations or a permit requirement may be prima facie evidence of negligence). However, if the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred before the standard of conduct was established in
such regulations, courts will be less likely to impose liability for such conduct. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
194.
Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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of harm is foreseeable and a reasonable person would have
taken some precautions against the potential harm. 195 Acts
which lead to an unreasonable risk of harm include improper
installation of a UST. 196 Omissions which may provide
grounds for a cause of action in negligence include the failure
to discontinue use and to repair a UST once a leak is
discovered. 197

3.

Causation

Causation requires a showing of both causation in fact and
of proximate cause. 198 Proximate cause requires that "legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that
the law is justified in imposing liability." 199 This determination is made by the court. Causation in fact must be proven by
the plaintiff.
Causation can, and generally must, be shown by circumstantial evidence. "Circumstantial evidence is crucial in each
case because direct cause and effect evidence is rarely available
because of inherent technical difficulties in tracing or replicating the path of pollutants to groundwater.'>200 Circumstantial
evidence concerning an unexplained loss of gasoline, combined
with the fact that a UST has been used beyond its recommended useful life, has been sufficient to find causation due to a lack
of direct evidence. 201
Circumstantial evidence was also sufficient when the following facts were proven: (1) defendant's service station was
the nearest source of gasoline, (2) a test of one of defendant's
USTs revealed that it was leaking, and (3) the service station
had sustained unexplained financial losses during the period in
question. 202 A plaintiff may consider pleading res ipsa
loquitur in order to meet the prima facie burden of showing

195.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 122 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 188, at 169, 174, 280).
196.
Monroe "66" Oil Co. v. Hightower, 180 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
197.
Cooper v. Whiting Oil Co., Inc., 311 S.E.2d 757 (Va. 1984).
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 188, at 265, 273-74.
198.
ld. at 264.
199.
200.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 125.
201.
Socony Mobil Oil v. Southwestern Bell Co., 518 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974).
202.
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Gaines Petroleum Co., 499 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct.
App. 1986).
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causation. Res ipsa loquitur, literally "the thing speaks for
itself," permits a "rebuttable presumption or inference that the
defendant was negligent [if the] instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and the accident was one
which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence."203

4. Actual harm to plaintiff
Failure by the plaintiff to allege actual damages will cause
a claim based in negligence to fait2 04 Furthermore, if there
are no actual damages, there can be no claim of negligence. 205
Prima facie evidence of damages may come from numerous
sources including medical records. 206

C.

Nuisance

A leaking petroleum UST may support an action based on
a nuisance theory. A "nuisance',z07 is the substantial208 and
unreasonable 209 interference with another's use and enjoyment of an interest in property. 210 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts indicates that the interference may arise from actions

203.
ITALIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 127 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1173 (5th ed. 1979)).
204.
PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 188, at 165.
205.
Exxon Corp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1897 (4th Cir.
1989).
206.
Cornell v. Exxon Corp., 558 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
207.
A nuisance may be either public or private. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
188, § 86, at 618-19. A public nuisance is an annoyance or inconvenience interfering with public rights. ld. A private nuisance involves the interference with right
of an individual, or group of individuals with a closely aligned interest, to the use
and enjoyment of an interest in property. ld.
As explained in Philadelphia Elec. Co. (PECO) v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1985), an innocent purchaser has no standing to bring an action for public
nuisance against the seller. Public nuisance is "an interference with the rights of
the community at large." ld. at 315. To recover under a public nuisance suit, a
private party must have suffered damages of a kind different from those suffered
by other members of the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(l)
(1977). The court rejected such a claim in PECO because PECO did not allege an
exercise of rights common to the general public. PECO, 762 F.2d at 316. The discussion in this section applies explicitly to private nuisances.
208.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 188, § 88, at 626-30.
209.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1977); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 188, § 88, at 626-30.
210.
REHl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977). "Nuisance is the unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one's property so that it substantially impairs
the right of another to peacefully enjoy his property." Frank v. Environmental
Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985).
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which are intentional, unintentional, negligent, reckless, or involve abnormally dangerous activities. 211 In fact, commentary
to the Restatement suggests that pollution of groundwater may
constitute a nuisance even though such pollution is usually not
based on intentional conduct "since the course of the waters is
usually unknown and the actor can thus foresee no more than
a risk or harm." 212
An interference with another's use and enjoyment of land
must be substantial to constitute a nuisance. When an interference with use and enjoyment "involves a detrimental change in
the physical condition of land, there is seldom any doubt as to
the significant character of the invasion."213 If the interference involves the pollution of groundwater-a hallmark of a
leaking petroleum UST-and the pollution has affected the
rental or market value of the plaintiffs property, the interference would be "substantial."214 It follows that the proper measure of damages is the diminution of rental or market value
which results from the nuisance. 215
The interference must also be unreasonable. Prosser and
Keeton define "unreasonable" in a circuitous fashion: the harm
is unreasonable if "it would not be reasonable to permit the
defendant to cause such an amount of harm intentionally without compensating for it."216 Courts perform a balancing test
in making this determination. The seriousness of the harm
involved is balanced against the utility of the activity or condition which gives rise to the alleged nuisance.
The Restatement factors used in weighing the gravity of
the harm involved include (1) the extent of the harm involved,
(2) the character of the harm involved, (3) the social value of
the use or enjoyment involved, (4) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment to the locality involved, and (5) the bur-

211.
RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). The Restatement treats the
pollution of ground water as unintentional. See id. § 382 cmt. f, § 825 illus. 2, 3.
Prosser and Keeton advocate the application of the theory of nuisance only if the
conduct involved was intentional. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 86, at
624.
RES"l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 832 cmt. f, illus. 7; see also Mel Foster
212.
Co. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988) (leaking UST constitutes a nuisance
without the need to show intentional conduct).
RESI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, cmt. d.
213.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 88, at 627.
214.
215.
Mel Foster Co. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1988).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 188, § 88, at 626.
216.
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den on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. :m The Restatement factors for evaluating the utility of the allegedly
annoying activity or condition include ( 1) the social value of the
activity, (2) the suitability of the activity to the locality involved, and (3) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding
the invasion. 218
The balancing test is dependent upon the Restatement
factors as well as the relative weight given to those factors. A
1932 case 219 decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court illustrates the application of a balancing test similar to that advanced by the Restatement. The case involved a leaking UST
at the defendant's oil refinery which was located in an industrial area. Petroleum leaked from the UST into the plaintiffs well
used for drinking water, rendering the water unfit for such use.
The court, concentrating on the location of the activity and the
value of the oil refineries in the particular area, 220 weighed
the plaintiffs harm against the utility of the defendant's activity and ruled that the activity did not constitute a nuisance.
However, fifty years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the 1932 decision. 221 In performing the balancing test
in the latter case, the court recognized a shift in public policy
toward greater regard for protecting the environment. The
court held that a claim of nuisance could be based on unintentional, non-negligent conduct in cases involving groundwater
pollution. 222
Note that an action for nuisance may not be maintained by
the innocent purchaser of real estate against the seller. A claim
of nuisance does not permit "a purchaser of real property to
recover from the seller ... for conditions existing on the very
land transferred." 223 Instead, liability for a nuisance rests
upon a "finding that [the defendant's] conduct violates a protected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff."224 Furthermore, lia-

217.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1977).
ld.
218.
219.
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934).
The court stated, in dicta, that in localities where oil refining was not as
220.
important to the economy, a claim of nuisance would be sustainable without a
showing of negligence. However, in areas dependant upon oil refining, a showing of
negligence would be required. Id.
221.
Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).
222.
Id.
223.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. (PECO) v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
ld. at 314 n.9 (quoting POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 704, at 320 (1969)).
224.
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bility continues as long as the nuisance continues. 225

D.

Strict Liability

The theory of strict liability for hazardous activities has its
roots in the English case, Rylands v. Fletcher. 226 The defendants in Rylands constructed a reservoir on their own land.
Water from the reservoir leaked into an abandoned mine shaft,
flowed through the shaft, and flooded the plaintiffs active coal
mine. Defendants could not be held liable for negligence because they were unaware of the abandoned mine. They hadn't
committed a trespass because the flooding was not sufficiently
sudden and direct. Furthermore, the flooding did not constitute
a nuisance since it was not offensive to the senses. Nevertheless, the English courts were not content to let the plaintiff go
uncompensated. Therefore, they fashioned a new doctrine
which would provide the plaintiff some relief. This doctrine,
sometimes called the rule of Rylands, imposes liability on a
person who brings on to his land something which, if it escapes, could do harm to another's property and which puts the
land to a "non-natural use."227
The doctrine of Rylands, which has evolved somewhat, is
found in section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm. 228
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the
possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
(1)

Extending the doctrine of nuisance to cover vendor·vendee disputes "is particularly
hazardous in an area, such as environmental pollution, where Congress and the
state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve a socially acceptable definition of
rights and liabilities." ld. at 315. Furthermore, "private nuisance law is a means of
efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses." ld.
at 314. Interestingly, one district court has allowed a private nuisance action
against a prior owner for cleanup costs by a subsequent buyer to withstand a
motion to dismiss. United States v. Allied Chern. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D.
Cal. 1984). However, in light of recent case law, the district court's ruling seems to
be atypical.
225.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840A (1977).
226.
159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affd, 3 L.R.-E.&I.
App. 330 (1968).
227.
ld. For a more complete discussion of Rylands, see John A. Chanin, Note
62 UN!V. COLO. 1. REV. 365, 383-85 (1991).
228.
RE&"TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
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The liability arises out of the activity's abnormal danger
and the risk of harm that it creates to those in proximity to the
activity. 229 Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors to
consider in deciding whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous":
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes. 230

Courts applying the Restatement factors to petroleum
leaks from USTs have reached differing conclusions. The court
in Arlington Forest Associates v. Exxon Corp., 231 held that the
strict liability provisions of the Restatement did not apply to a
gasoline leak from a service station. The court focused its analysis on whether the operation of the service station could be
made safe through the exercise of reasonable care. Absolute
safety, the court noted, is not required. 232 Instead, the court
determined that the attendant "risk must be reducible by due
care to a point where the likelihood of harm is no longer
high." 233 The court concluded that "[m]aintained, monitored,
and used with due care, underground gasoline storage tanks
present virtually no risk of injury from seepage of their contents."234

229.
ld., cmt. d.
2:10.
ld. § 520. For a discussion of the Restatement criteria as they relate to
USTs, see Dennis M. Toft & Stephen H. Bier, N.J. L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 20.
231.
774 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1991).
232.
ld. at 390.
233.
ld.
234.
ld. (emphasis added). Other courts have not been as willing to impose liability under the strict liability theory. A few courts have viewed cleanup costs and
diminution of property value as injury which is not the type of damages to which
strict liability attaches. Pinole Point Prop., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 292, n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (dicta). Second, one court has refused to apply
the doctrine where other remedies exist. Bagley v. Controlled Envtl. Corp., 503
A.2d 823, 825-26 (N.H. 1986). Even so, strict liability is an alternative which inno-
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Other courts have applied the Restatement's strict liability
provisions when USTs are located near residential areas or in
close proximity to a community's water supply. 235 These
courts have reasoned that placing gasoline USTs in close proximity to residential areas does not constitute common usage. In
addition, these courts opine that the USTs present a risk of
contamination of the water supply. One court stated that
"locat[ing] a large supply of such a highly toxic chemical in
close proximity to the water supply of an entire community is
clearly inappropriate."236 Furthermore, the court determined
that widespread use of such tanks does not diminish their inherently dangerous nature: "it is proper to surmise that this
risk [of a leak] cannot [be] or at least was not, eliminated by
the exercise of reasonable care."237 Moreover, since there are
"many hazardous activities which are socially desirable, it now
seems reasonable that they pay their own way."238
Plaintiffs should be able to plead strict liability to reach
assets of a successor in interest to a person who is responsible
for a petroleum leak from a UST. In T & E Industries, Inc. v.
Safety Light Corp., 239 the purchaser of land brought an action
in strict liability against the successor corporation of the polluter. The court ruled that there is no distinction between the
rights of a successor in title to use land and the rights of a
neighboring land owner. 240
V.

CONCLUSION

The ubiquitous petroleum UST presents the possibility of
enormous environmental hazards. An estimated two million
cent purchasers might use when few other options for recovery exist.
235.
See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Colo. 1981). In emphasizing the hazard presented by USTs containing gasoline near
residential areas, the court characterized the defendant's UST as "not merely fuel,
but a highly volatile, explosive, and toxic substance as well as one of the most
powerful solvents commonly available." ld. at 516.
236.
McLaughlin v. Time Mkts., Inc., 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 41, 42 (June 10,
1987).
237.
Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969).
238.
Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(spill from a settling pond containing phosphate slimes). For a general discussion of
strict liability for hazardous enterprise, see William K. Jones, Strict Liability {or
Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992).
239.
3 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 424 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
ld.; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 655 F.
240.
Supp. 1257 (3d Cir. 1989) (risk is measured not by what polluter knew of risk, but
by what was known as of time of remediation).
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such tanks exists. Approximately one-quarter of them are leaking. Because such tanks are used extensively throughout the
United States at diverse business and residential locations, the
possibility exists that a purchaser might unwittingly come into
possession of real estate which contains such a tank or which
has been contaminated by petroleum leaked by a UST in proximity to that real estate.
Even though USTs are regulated by federal law, those laws
provide little relief for the innocent purchaser who purchases
land containing a leaking petroleum UST. CERCLA is inapplicable due to its petroleum exclusion. RCRA is applicable to
petroleum USTs. Although RCRA does provide a scheme for
regulating the use of USTs, it provides little relief against
former owners of real estate containing the leaking UST.
Various common law remedies may be employed by the
innocent purchaser. These remedies include actions based on
the sales contract, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. An
innocent purchaser should be able to obtain some relief by
resort to these common law theories. The relief available will,
of course, depend upon the facts of each case, which theories of
relief may be employed, and the extent of available direct and
circumstantial evidence available to determine the party responsible for the damage caused by the leaking UST.

